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This thesis is divided into two parts, where two diverse application areas of 
fault detection and forecast are studied. In the first part of the thesis, we will be 
looking at fault detection and diagnosis in an F-16 aircraft. Most of the past works on 
fault detection and diagnosis are in the area of large scale industrial applications. 
There are little works on fault detection and diagnosis in F-16 aircraft.  
In this thesis, the model-based approach is used for fault detection and 
diagnosis. The F-16 aircraft was simulated with and without noise and possible 
actuator faults. Residuals were generated by taking the difference in output of the two 
systems. By studying the system residuals, chi-square testing method was proposed to 
be used for the detection of actuator faults.  
When a fault is detected, the system residuals are further studied for fault 
diagnosis. Some useful information was extracted from the residuals, which was 
defined as residual characteristics. Most past research works use the extended Kalman 
filter for fault isolation. Using the proposed method, different actuator faults are 
determined from the different residual characteristics. 
In the second part of the thesis, crashes in the stock markets were studied. 
Two different approaches for crash forecast were proposed: the technical approach 
using log-periodic mathematical model and the indicator approach which uses 
indicators to set up an early warning system (EWS) for market crashes.  
The technical approach involves using a log-periodic formula to determine the 
crash time of a stock index. There are some works on using log-periodic formula for 
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crash forecast in the stock markets. However, no work has been done on the local 
Singapore market and on the recent stock market crashes arising from the subprime 
mortgages. In the thesis, the log-periodic formula for crash forecast is extended to 
study on the local market and US markets. 
As the log-periodic formula is complex, it is broken down into two parts. The 
first part describes the power law behaviour of the stock price and the second part 
describes its log-periodic oscillation. The critical time obtained from the second part 
of the formula was taken as the crash time forecast of the stock market. This method 
was applied on S&P 500 to predict its crash for the Black Monday in 1987, the Straits 
Times Index to predict its crash during the dot-com bubble and the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average to predict the crisis in 2008.  
The indicator approach involves determining the relevance of the various 
economic, real sector and commodity indicators to stock market crashes. There are 
past works on using economic indicators to form an early warning system (EWS) for 
currency crisis. However, no work has been done on the relevance of these indictors 
to stock market crashes.  
In this thesis, study is done on the relevance of economic indicators on stock 
market crashes. Indicators that are useful in the forecast of stock markets’ crashes are 
identified. These indicators would form the components of the EWS. Weights are 
assigned to these components to form the EWS indicator, which issues a signal, 
warning of a probable market crash within the next 12 months. 
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CHAPTER 1   INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
In our everyday life, we encounter many dynamical systems. At home, we 
make use of many simple appliances that are dynamic in nature. An example is the 
air-conditioner system, whose operation is dependant on its changing environmental 
factors.  
In industrial and engineering applications, the physical dynamical systems are 
large and complex. These complex systems have many different parts and 
components, making them difficult to control. The complexity of the systems means 
that they are prone to system errors, component faults and abnormal operations.  The 
effect of the faults and errors can be costly. They may cause the systems to 
malfunction. If not detected and corrected early, the malfunctions may have serious 
implications to productivity and may even put the safety of the users at risk.  
For example, in industrial applications, the presence of faults in a power plant 
reduces the performance of the plant and causes it to work less efficiently. The fault 
may even cause permanent damage to the plant and cause the system to stop 
functioning. This causes system down time, resulting in the loss of production time. 
In an aircraft, the presence of faults may result in abnormal movements of the aircraft. 
In the worst case scenario, the malfunction of the aircraft may even cause it to crash, 
jeopardising the safety of the pilot and his passengers. 
In recent decades, there has been an increasing interest in fault detection and 
diagnosis in engineering applications. R. Isermann and P. Balle [1] have observed and 
gathered the developments of fault detection and diagnosis at selected conferences 
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during 1991 – 1995. In the paper, they have observed that parameter estimation and 
observer-based methods are used most often for fault detection. There is also a 
growing trend in research in the area of neutral network based method for fault 
detection.  
The researches on fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) span over many 
different areas of engineering applications. The research areas include small scale 
laboratory processes like fault detection in induction motor [2] and large scale 
industrial processes like the application of residual generation to a heat exchanger [3]. 
There are some works on fault detection in different types of aircrafts, like the 
Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft [4, 5], PIPER PA 30 aircraft [6, 19, 
20] and B747 commercial aircraft [7]. In the first part of this thesis, we will 
concentrate on fault detection and isolation (FDI) in the F-16 aircraft. 
In general, faults are deviations from the normal behaviour of the system. 
There are many types of faults in the systems, including additive process faults, 
multiplicative process faults, sensor faults and actuator faults. 
Additive process faults are faults caused by unknown inputs to the system. 
These unknown inputs cause abnormal behaviour in the outputs. An example of 
additive process fault in an aircraft is the wind gust. 
Multiplicative process faults are faults caused by the changes in plant 
parameters. These multiplicative faults cause the output of a component to be 
amplified. An example is the deterioration of a system component, which causes it to 
operate less effectively. 
Sensor faults are faults due to differences between measured outputs and the 
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actual outputs. These are usually due to failures of the sensors of the systems. 
Actuator faults are faults due to the differences in the input commands of 
actuators and the outputs of actuators. Common actuator faults include lock in-place 
(LIP) fault, float fault, hard-over fault (HOF) and loss of effectiveness (LOE) fault. 
The LIP fault occurs when the actuator is stuck at a certain value. The actuator output 
no longer reacts to the input command. The float fault occurs when the actuator floats 
at zero regardless of the input command. In HOF, the actuator moves to its upper or 
lower limit position regardless of the input command. In LOE fault, the actuator gain 
is reduced, thus the actuator output is reduced too. In this thesis, we will focus on 
actuator faults. Simulations will be done on LIP fault and the simulation results will 
be discussed.  
 Fault analysis consists of two stages: fault detection and fault diagnosis. In 
fault detection, the system is monitored to check if there is any malfunctioning of the 
system. Accuracy and speed of detection are important. The number of false alarm 
and undetected faults should be kept to the minimum and the speed of detection to be 
as fast as possible. When a fault is detected, fault diagnosis follows. Fault diagnosis 
consists of two parts: fault isolation and identification. Fault isolation involves 
locating the source of the fault and fault identification involves estimating the 
magnitude of the fault. This research focuses mainly on fault isolation in an F-16 
aircraft. 
Fault detection and diagnosis methods can be broadly classified into three 




Model-based fault detection can further be classified into two categories: 
quantitative and qualitative models. Quantitative models make use of differential 
equation, state space model or transfer function for model analysis. Some common 
methods used for fault detection include parameter estimation, state estimation and 
parity space concept. A comprehensive mathematical model is required for this 
approach.   
Qualitative models make use of qualitative reasoning to detect fault. More 
commonly used methods include fault tree analysis (FTA) and event tree analysis 
(ETA) to determine the probability of a safety hazard using Boolean logic.  
Knowledge-based methods make use of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques 
to detect fault. These methods include artificial neural networks (ANN) and fuzzy 
logic. The neural network approach involves training the neurons in the networks, 
which are then used to model the complex relationship between the inputs and the 
outputs. Fuzzy logic method is based on simple rules that are approximate rather than 
precise. These methods are used in large complex system applications, as explicit 
mathematical models of the systems are not required.  
 In the signal-based approach, signal-processing methods such as spectral 
analysis and principle components analysis (PCA) are used. These signal-processing 
methods do not required explicit model application.  
  Most of the past academic works on fault detection in an aircraft involve one 
or a combination of the methods described above. According to the compilation of 
research papers by R. Isermann and P. Balle [1], there has been an increased interest 
in the research on model-based fault detection and diagnosis methods in the last 
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decade. In aircraft applications, there are works using extended Kalman filter (EKF) 
in their model-based approach [11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 21].  
 Y.J.P Wei and S. Ghayem (1991) used EKF or residual generation and a 
likelihood ratio filter to compensate for the damage effect of the residue [12]. R. 
Kumar (1997) has further researched on the robustness issue in fault detection and 
has developed a Graphic User Interface (GUI) for actuator fault detection and surface 
damage fault detection and isolation [11].  
 P. Eide and P. Maybeck (1995) made an evaluation of the multiple model 
adaptive estimation (MMAE), which uses a series of Kalman filters for detecting 
faults [1995]. They (1997) further implemented MMAE on a non-linear six-degree-
of-motion F-16 aircraft for single and dual complete failures of the system actuators 
and sensors.  
Other popular model-based methods for fault detection in aircrafts include 
analytical redundancy [6, 10, 19, 20] and the use of parity equations [13, 14]. 
Analytical redundancy refers to analysing the system by comparing the information 
from actual system and the redundant information. Redundant information can be 
generated by using several sensors measuring the same physical quantities or by using 
mathematical description of the system. 
S. Simani, M. Bonfe, P. Castaldi and W. Geri (2007) applied the analytical 
redundancy method to a PIPPER PA30 aircraft to test for sensor faults. They analysed 
the residues with fixed thresholds to check for any faults in the sensors. In another 
paper (2007), they have also designed two FDI schemes based on polynomial method 
and nonlinear geometric approach [10].  
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In recent years, there has been increased interest in using machine-learning 
method for aircraft FDD [9, 22]. Y. M Chen and M. L Lee (2001) used the multilayer 
radial basis function (RBF) neural network as fault detection for nonlinear 
approximation of the F-16 aircraft model [22]. W.Z Yan (2006) applied the random 
forest classifier to aircraft engine fault diagnosis [9]. The advantage of using such 
methods is that no explicit mathematical model is required. However, there might be 
problems on non-convergence of training data.  
In this thesis, a model-based approach is used in analysing F-16 actuator 
faults. An analytical redundancy method is used for residual generation. There are 
some related works using analytical redundancy method for fault detection in F-16 
aircraft [12, 15, 17]. The difference between our work and past work is the extraction 
of residual characteristics from the generated residual for fault isolation. In our work, 
useful information is extracted from the residuals generated from the outputs of the 
systems and residual characteristics are defined by observing the behaviours of these 
residuals. With these residual characteristics, it is possible to isolate the different 
actuator faults present in the F-16 aircraft.  
Other than the engineering world, “faults” also exist in financial markets. In 
the financial world, the stocks markets are dynamical systems that change with 
different market conditions. “Faults” come in the form of crashes in the stock 
markets. Since history, there were many large crashes in the stock markets. These 
crashes belong to the category of “extreme events” in complex systems and the 
sudden collapse of prices in the financial world had caught academics and investors 
by surprise. Many studies on major financial crashes have been carried out. Most took 
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the form of post-mortem analysis of historical crashes.  
Market crashes have devastating effects on investments. The Black Monday’s 
crash on 19 October 1987 saw DJIA dropping by 22.6%, wiping out US$500 billion 
in stock value in a single day [47]. It caused some investors to lose their savings 
overnight. The number of bankruptcies rose and businesses were affected, resulting in 
socio-economical problems.  
Since history, many academics have studied market crashes and have tried to 
explain them. It is generally believed that many market crashes were followed by the 
build-up of “speculative bubbles”. During the build-up phrase, the economy was 
strong, usually characterised by high growth rate, low inflation and low 
unemployment rate. Consumers were willing to spend and investors were optimistic 
on the outlook of these companies in these growing industries. Stock prices increased 
and investors were willing to pay high prices for these “growth companies”. Price-
earning ratio (P/E ratio) became unusually high as speculators bided up the prices of 
the stocks.  
However, the “bubble” burst when investor began to realise that the even high 
growth rate of the companies is inadequate to substantiate the inflated P/E ratio of the 
companies. The market became panic-stricken and collapsed. Throughout history, 
there were many instances of crashes of such nature. The tulip mania and the South 
Sea bubble were two famous examples.  
The tulip mania refers to period in Netherland’s history where high prices 
were charged on tulip bulbs due to high demand [48]. Tulip speculation took place in 
the early 17th century when tulips was popular among the Dutch and became an 
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important plant in the Dutch garden. During that period, a single bulb of famous tulip 
could cost more than ten times the annual income of an average Dutch. Some traders 
sold land and houses to invest in tulip, with an expected monthly return of more than 
40 times of his annual income. Greed and absurd expectation on investment return 
gave rise to speculation in tulip trading. As the price of tulips had been constantly 
increasing, the future contracts were popular to buyers. This sale of future contracts 
exacerbated the “speculative bubble”.   
In early 1637, the prices of tulip had risen so high that people became 
sceptical on the sustainability of the inflated price of a tulip bulb. People began to 
decrease their demand for tulips, and as a result, prices of tulips dropped. Tulip 
traders could no longer fetch excessive price for their tulips. The market became 
pessimistic and panic spread. Eventually traders were met with difficulty selling their 
tulips. The bubble burst and the price of a tulip bulb dropped drastically, leaving 
investors with future contracts of tulips at prices more than ten times its current price.  
The collapse of the tulip mania is a classical example of how “mania” could 
result in exorbitant market prices, but this inflated price is unsustainable. This case is 
still being widely discussed by academics in present day. 
Another classical example of “speculative bubble” in history is the South Sea 
bubble [49]. It refers to the speculation of the South Sea Company in the early 18th 
century. The South Sea Company was a British company granted monopoly rights to 
trade with South America in 1711. In return, it had to assume £10 million short-term 
government debt.  
In 1719, it owned £11.7 million out of the £50 million public debt. In order to 
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increase the number of shares issued, the directors proposed the scheme of buying 
more than half the British government public debt in January 1720. Before the 
proposal was accepted in April 1720, the company had started to spread rumours on 
the value of potential trade in South America. The share price shot up drastically from 
£100 pound in January and surpassed the psychological barrier of £1000 in June, 
fuelled by frenzy buying by investors from all social classes. The company would 
even lend people money to buy its share.  
Gradually, more and more people became sceptical that the inflated price 
could be sustained. The bubble eventually burst when people began to sell off their 
shares. The stock price fell drastically and many investors became bankrupts. The 
effect of the collapse of bubble was contagious. Banks were affected as speculators 
could not repay loans taken to speculate in the South Sea Company. 
There were also crashes whose origins could not be traced back to the 
“speculative bubble”. This makes prediction of crashes difficult due to the different 
nature and the different leading factors of each crash.  
According to the efficient market hypothesis, crashes are caused by the 
broadcast of a new piece of information in the market. Investors are bombarded with 
enormous information from different sources everyday, making it difficult to identify 
useful information. Black (1986) explained how noises could affect the market and 
made the market inefficient [32]. Testing of models and economic theories is 
complicated by the existence of such noises.  
In the paper “Does the Stock Market Overreact?”, De Bondt and Richard 
(1985) established two portfolios: the “loser portfolio” and the “winner portfolio” 
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[33]. The “loser portfolio” consists of stocks that have experienced significant capital 
loss over a period while the “winner portfolio” consists of stocks that have 
experienced large capital gain over the same time period. They found that the “loser” 
outperformed the “winner” by 25% three years after establishing these portfolios. 
This shows that the market overreacts in view of unexpected events. It is possible that 
such overreaction might cause “panic” selling upon the release of negative news and 
cause the market to crash.  
In the book “Trading Catalysts”, Webb (2007) has listed various events that 
moved the market [34]. He called these events trading catalysts. These trading 
catalysts include Federal Reserve interest rate cut, comments by influential politicians 
like Alan Greenspan, geopolitical events like the Iraq War and natural diseases. By 
identifying these trading catalysts, it is possible to look at how global events could 
affect stock prices and the extent of stock movements in response to events. 
Through technical analysis, Didier Sornette tried to explain major market 
crashes in his book “Why Stock Markets Crash: Critical Events in Complex Financial 
Systems” [37]. He proposed a log-periodic formula to predict crashes and tested the 
formula against several major stock markets [38]. However, no work has been done 
on the Singapore stock market and on the current stock market crashes caused by 
massive delinquency of subprime mortgages.  
The log-periodic formula proposed by D. Sornette is too complex with many 
variables. In the second part of this thesis, we break the formula down into two parts: 
the power law component, and the log-periodic oscillation component. First, we 
check the accuracy for the prediction of crash date using our method, by applying it to 
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Standard and Poor 500 (S&P 500) crash on 1987 Black Monday. Then we use this 
methodology to study the Straits Times Index (STI) crash in 2000 and the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA) crash in the 2008 global financial crisis. 
From the fundamentalist point of view, macroeconomic indicators reflect the 
state of the economy and generally the movement of stock prices indicates investors’ 
changes in expectation of the economy. It is possible that investors and speculators 
would take signals from the changes in the macroeconomic indicators.  
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) have identified several leading 
economic indicators in their early warning system (EWS) model to detect currency 
crisis [30]. Edison (2000) has derived an operational EWS model, tested it on various 
countries and found that there were many false alarms of crisis episodes in his model 
in detecting currency crises [31].  
Zhuang and Dowling (2002) improvised the EWS model by introducing 
weightings to indicators to show their relative importance in predicting a currency 
crisis [36]. They identified several useful leading indicators for the model, which is 
able to identify the currency crisis in Asian economy during the financial turmoil. 
These indicators include current account balance, components in the capital account, 
performance of financial sector, the real sector, and the fiscal sector. However, the 
author has only used the model to detect the currency crisis.  
Although there are several works on using indicators to construct a EWS for 
currency crisis, there has been no work done on the relevance of these indicators on 
stock market crashes. In the second part of this thesis, the relevance of some 
indicators on crash forecast in stock markets will be studied. Indicators include 
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commodity prices and market indicators which have not been studied previously.  
With the selected indicators, EWS for signal generation is formed to warn of a 
probable stock market crash within the next 12 months.  
1.2 Objective 
In this thesis, two applications of fault detection and forecast are investigated. 
The first application is in an engineering domain, involving detection and diagnosis in 
an F-16 aircraft. The second application is in the financial domain, where stock 
market crashes are predicted. 
The first part of the thesis focuses on fault detection and isolation in the F-16 
aircraft. A model-based approach is adopted to check the actuator faults in the 
system. Two simulation models, one to simulate a real F-16 system with noise and 
faults and the other to simulate an ideal F-16 system that is not corrupted by noise or 
faults, are used. Simulations are done for an ideal system so that the real outputs can 
be compared to the ideal outputs for the residual generation for analysis. 
In Chapter 2, a general description of the F-16 aircraft, the aircraft dynamics 
and the simulation models will be given. The aircraft position, its orientation and the 
equations used to describe the aircraft dynamics will be defined. The simulation 
models will then be introduced. As the models used are nonlinear, we will set the 
simulation conditions and parameters needed to find the trim condition of the aircraft. 
After introducing the F-16 aircraft models, the FDI methods that used in this 
thesis and the simulation results will be presented. The FDI process consists of two 
parts: the detection of faults by analysing residuals generated and the isolation of 
faults. In Chapter 3, the methodology used for fault detection and the simulation 
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results will be shown. The fault detection process involves studying the system 
outputs generated from the simulation models. The differences in system outputs of 
the two models are compared and residuals are generated. The chi-square test is then 
performed on the residuals to check for fault.  
When a fault is detected, the residuals are further analysed to isolate the faults. 
In Chapter 4, these residuals will be processed to extract the certain characteristics of 
the residuals. After which, the relationship between the input actuator faults and the 
processed residual characteristics will be sought. 
In the second part of the thesis, financial market crashes are studied. Two 
different methods to analyse stock market crashes are proposed. The first method 
takes the technical analysis approach, whereby a log-periodic formula is used to 
predict stock market crashes; the other is the EWS model approach, whereby 
fundamental indicators like the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), interest rate 
and consumer price index (CPI) and other market indicators are used to create a EWS 
model for stock market crashes. 
In Chapter 5, we present the log-periodic formula for stock market crash 
prediction and apply it on the S&P 500, the STI and the DJIA for crash prediction. 
First, we will describe the mechanism behind the log-periodic behaviour of the stock 
prices. Then we will explain the different parameters in the log-periodic formula and 
the three-step process of finding the various parameters identified in the formula. 
Lastly, we will apply the methodology to the stock indices to find a crash date and 
compare it with the date of the actual crash.  
In Chapter 6, we will look at the EWS model approach in predicting crashes. 
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First, we will describe the indicators used in our EWS model and look at the 
performance of each indicator in crash detection. Then we would describe the EWS 
model, which we use in detecting stock market crashes. Finally, we will apply this 
EWS model to test the accuracy in predicting large drop in the S&P 500 in the period 
1981-2005 and large drop in the STI in the period 1995-2004. 
In chapter 7, we summarise and conclude the work done on fault detection and 
diagnosis in the F16 systems and crash analysis in the stock markets. We will also 




PART I – F16 AIRCRAFTS 
CHAPTER 2  F-16 AIRCRAFT MODEL 
2.1 Aircraft Dynamics 
 The Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon (F-16) is a single-engine, 
supersonic, multirole technical aircraft. Being lighter weight and easier to operate as 
compared to its predecessors, it is the world’s most popular fighter plane, with more 
than 4400 aircrafts built for air forces of 25 countries [28].  
The nonlinear aircraft model used in this thesis is based on the book written 
by Lewis and Stevens (1992) [23]. We assume that the F-16 is a rigid body, which 
means that all in point in the aircraft remains in fixed relative position at all time. 
Being a fighter aircraft, F-16 is designed to have little body flexibility. Thus the 
assumption is valid. The centre of mass (CM) of the aircraft is also assumed to 
coincide with its centre of gravity (CG) in a uniform gravitational field.  
In this model, the centre of mass is considered as the coordinate origin. The 
motion of equations of the rigid aircraft can be separated into translation motions and 
rotational motions. When fixed in space, the rotational motions correspond to the 
rolling, pitching and yawing of the aircraft. The other three degrees of freedom are 
the translational motions of the aircraft. Thus, the derived state model is an F-16 
aircraft model with six degree-of-freedom. 
The coordinate axes of the aircraft x, y and z are defined to be mutually 
perpendicular. With the CM as the coordinate origin, x-axis is defined positive 
through the aircraft’s nose, y-axis is positive through the starboard (right) wing and z-
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axis is positive downwards, according to the right-hand screw rule. u, v and w are the 
velocities in the x, y and z directions respectively; p is the roll rate, q is the pitch rate 
and r is the yaw rate; L is the rolling moment, M is the pitching moment and N is the 
yawing moment. The orientation of the aircraft is shown on the figure below: 
 
 
Figure 1 Definition of aircraft directions 
12 state variables are chosen to form the state vector.  Three components of 
position (pN, pE, h) are chosen to describe the potential energy in the gravitation field 
and three components of velocity (u, v, w) are chosen to describe the translational 
kinetic energy.  Another three components of angular velocity (p, q, r) are chosen to 
describe the rotational kinetic energy and finally three Euler angles (φ ,θ ,ψ ) are 
chosen to specify the orientation relative to the gravity vector. Using the model 
described by Steven and Lewis [23], we have the following force equations, 
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  (2.5) 
where   2xzzx JJJ −=Γ  






h  are the north, east and vertical 
components of aircraft velocity in the north-east-down (NED) coordinate system in 
the locally geographical plane on the Earth’s surface. Other parameters like φ , θ  
andψ  are the roll angle, pitch angle and yaw angle respectively. In the six-DOF 
model, NMLFFF zyx ,,,,, are the force and moment components in the x-, y-, and z-
axis respectively, which are dependent on the aerodynamic and thrust components of 
the system. In the equations (2.5), J is the moment of inertia in the various axis. 
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The forces and moments acting on the complete aircraft are defined in terms 











































 The various dimensionless coefficients CD, CL, CY, CL, CM and CN depend on 
the actuator deflections and the aerodynamic angles: angle of attack, alpha (α), and 

































































As demonstrated above, these aerodynamic and thrust components are 
  
 20 
dependant on the control surface deflections. The control surface deflections, together 
with the throttle setting, are the inputs to the nonlinear system: 
 
T
rudailelthlinu ],,,[ δδδδ=      (2.9) 
 
The control input uin consists of throttle setting (δthl), elevator deflection (δel), 
aileron deflection (δail) and rudder deflection (δrud) respectively. The expression (2.9) 
presents the control input and its components.  
Mass properties and wing dimensions of the F-16 aircraft are given in Table 1 
and 2 respectively. Other parameters for the aircraft include its reference c.g. location 
Xcg = 0.35 c  and the engine angular momentum assumed to be fixed at 160 slut-ft2/s. 
Table 1 Mass Properties of F-16 Aircraft 
Weight (lbs): W = 20,500 
Moments of Inertia (slug-ft2): Jxx = 9,496 
 
Jyy = 55,814 
 
Jzz = 63,100 
 
Jxz = 982 
 
Table 2 Wing Dimensions of F-16 Aircraft 
Span 30 ft 
Area 300 ft2 
m.a.c 11.32 ft 
 
2.2 Simulation Model 
This thesis makes use of the F-16 model constructed by the students in the 
Aerospace Engineering and Control Science and Dynamical Systems Department at 
the University of Minnesota, supervised by Dr Gary Bala. There are two simulation 
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models: the low-fidelity (lo-fi) model, which is based on Stevens and Lewis [23] and 
the high-fidelity (hi-fi) model, which is based on NASA Technical Paper 1538 [24].  
Both models use the same navigation equations and the equations of motions. 
The difference between the lo-fi and the hi-fi model is that the hi-fi model has an 
additional control surface, the leading edge flap deflection, which allows the aircraft 
to fly at a higher angle of attack. However, as we are not considering cases where the 
aircraft is flying at high angle of attack in this thesis, the simpler lo-fi model will be 
used in our research. 
The Simulink model (Figure 2) consists of “The Cockpit” for pilot and control 
input, the F-16 nonlinear plant, integrator of state variables, leading edge flap 
deflection for feedback and output. The plant requires 13 input variables. Nine of 
these 13 variables are described in the previous section. These nine variables are 
north position (pN), east position (pE), altitude ( h ), roll angle (φ ), pitch angle (θ ), 
yaw angle (ψ ), roll rate ( p ), pitch rate ( q ) and yaw rate ( r ). The other four 
variables are total velocity ( tV ), angle of attack (α ), angle of side-slip ( β ) and the 
leading edge flap deflection ( LEFδ ). However, the model only allows us control over 
thrust ( thlδ ), elevator deflection ( elδ ), aileron deflection ( ailδ ) and rudder deflection 
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The system output is an 18 dimension vector. Other than the 12 variables 
described earlier, the other six components in the system output vector are the 
normalised accelerations in the x, y and z directions ( nznynx aandaa , ), the Mach 
number M, the free-stream dynamic pressure q and the static pressure Ps.  
In this thesis, we design a residual generator (Figure 3) by modifying the 
Simulink model created by Dr Gary Bala’s team. We have created two plants, one to 
simulate fault in a real F-16 system corrupted with noise and the other to simulate an 
F-16 model operating under ideal conditions with no fault or noise. Outputs from the 
second plant provide estimates for the real system’s output under ideal conditions. 
We control “The Cockpit” of the systems to inject noise and faults to the systems. In 
this thesis, we will call the system with noise and fault to be the “F-16 plant” and the 
nominal system without noise and fault “F-16 model”. These two systems, together 































































































































































































































































































Figure 4 shows the internal functioning of “The Cockpit” of the F-16 plant 
whereby random white noise is added and actuator faults are modelled. The trim 
value setting is calculated from the initial states of the system. This is done by the F-
16 nonlinear model routine, to ensure that the system is in a stable state of flight. This 
trim value setting represents the equilibrium point of the aircraft at the particular 
flight condition. This is the point whereby all the state derivatives are equal to zero.  
Figure 5 shows the internal functioning of “The Cockpit” of the F-16 model 
whereby the control inputs are the trim values of thrust, elevator deflection, aileron 
deflection and rudder deflection calculated. The actuator blocks convert the input 

































































































































































































































































































































































































From Figure 6, we can see the internal functioning of both the F-16 plant and 
F-16 model. The inputs to the nlplant (non-linear) block are the 13 state variables 
calculated according to the trim conditions of the aircraft and four input controls. The 
leading edge flap (LEF) deflection and fidelity flag are zeros for the lo-fi mode. The 
output from the “nlplant” is a 12-dimension vector as discussed earlier.  
Fideli ty Flage tel ls nlplant 
which Model to use:

















Figure 6 F-16 Nonlinear Plant  
 In the simulation, an F-16 aircraft manoeuvring at steady wings-level flight is 
considered. The aircraft’s velocity is set at 500ft/s and the altitude of cruising is set at 
15000ft. For the simulation of faults, only the LIP actuator faults are considered. An 
LIP actuator fault occurs when an actuator is stuck at a certain value. In the 
simulations, these values are set near the threshold values of the respective actuators 
to simulate actuators stuck at near threshold values.  
The fault vector as F has three components f1, f2, and f3. These three 
components represent three physical actuators of the system, with f1 representing the 
elevator actuator, f2 representing the aileron actuator and f3 representing the rudder 
actuator. The component fi is encoded 1 if there is fault in the particular actuator; 
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otherwise fi is encoded with 0.  Table 3 shows the different faults that were 
considered in the simulation. 
Table 3 Fault coding 
Fault code Components 
F1 (1, 0, 0)T 
F2 (0, 1, 0)T 
F3 (0, 0, 1)T 
F4 (1, 1, 0)T 
F5 (1, 0, 1)T 
F6 (0, 1, 1)T 





CHAPTER 3  FAULT DETECTION 
3.1 Methodology 
 The method used for fault detection is similar to the work of Mehra and 
Pescon (1971) on the generation of error signal or innovation process [25], R. 
Kumar’s work (1997) on failure detection of actuator and the work of C.L Lin and 
C.T Liu (2007) on the calculation of the total error between the actual system and the 
ideal system. The error signal or innovation process is defined as the difference 
between actual system output and the expected model output. In this thesis, this 
inconsistency of behaviour between the actual and expected outputs is referred to as 
residuals of the system. The fault detection technique is based on statistical decision 
theory, where statistical analysis of the residuals is used to detect fault in the system. 
The F-16 residual generator model (Figure 3), mentioned in Chapter 2 
monitors the system for any possible sign of faults. It consists of two systems: the F-
16 plant used to simulate the real F-16 that has noise and possible faults and the F-16 
model used to simulate an F-16 operating in the absence of noise and fault. The 
outputs of the two plants are compared to generate the residuals of the system. 
From Figure 7, we can see the 12 output variables from the plants. From the 
12 output variables, we select six variables (θ , φ , ψ , P, Q, R) for observation and 
comparison between the measured output and the output estimate of the system. The 
measurement output of the F-16 plant is denoted by 
TkRkQkPkkkkY )](),(),(),(),(),([)( ψφθ=  and the estimate using the F-16 model is 
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Figure 7 Plant outputs 
The residual vector is denoted by  
)()()( kYkYkR )−=     (3.1) 
R(k) is a 6-dimensional vector. Under ideal conditions, the residuals should be 
zero when there is no fault or error in the system. However, the residuals are not zero 
due to system noises and disturbances.  
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If the system is functioning normally, the residual is a zero mean white noise 
of known covariance V(j). It is a Gaussian process with a flat power spectral density. 
For fault detection, we define the statistic I(k) in (3.2), which is a chi-square random 









1 )()()()(    (3.2) 
This statistic is compared to the threshold value ε  using a chi-square table at a 
certain confidence level or the probability of failure Pf. For example, using the chi-
square table, ε  for 30 degrees of freedom at a confidence level of 0.001 is 59.7. We 












     (3.3) 
From the statistics, we can conclude that fault is present in the system with a 
confidence level Pf if I(k) calculated is greater than the threshold value ε . If I(k) 
calculated is less than ε , we reject H0 and conclude that there is no fault in the 
system. 
3.2 Simulation Results 
In the simulation, six output variables (θ , φ , ψ , P, Q, R) are selected to 
generate the residual vector )(kR . The window length N is set to 5 seconds with a 
confidence level Pf = 0.001. From the chi-square table, the threshold value for 
rejection at Pf = 0.001 with Np = 30 degree of freedom is 59.7.  
First, we run the simulation for 30 seconds under normal (no-fault) condition, 
with only random white noise added to the real model. Figure 8 shows plots of the 
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residuals of the six output variables studied. We can see that the fluctuations of the 
residual values are within 2±  due to white noise in the system. The I(k) obtained is 
less than the threshold value 59.7 (Figure 9). From this statistics, we reject H0 and 
conclude that the system is fault-free, which is in line with what we have expected. 
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Figure 9 I(k) under normal condition 
 Next, we run the simulation under various fault conditions (Table 3). Each of 
the 3 actuator faults and the different combination of these faults are simulated in the 
real system, corrupted with random white noise. The onset of fault is set at t = 5.0. 
Figures 10 to 16 show the various plots of the residuals of the six outputs under 
different fault conditions. We can see that the residual behaviours are different under 
different fault conditions. 
With the residuals obtained, I(k) is updated using (3.2) and compared to the 
threshold, which is set to 59.7 obtained using the chi-square table. When I(k) first 
exceeds the threshold, the detection time td is noted. From Figure 17, we can see the 
plot of the statistic I(k) for elevator failure, up to the time when it exceeds the 
threshold of 59.7. I(k) increases substantially after t = 5 at the time of the fault. The 
time when I(k) exceeds the threshold of 59.7 is noted. Similarly, the process is done 





























































































Figure 10 Residuals under elevator fault 
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Figure 11 Residuals under aileron fault 
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Figure 12 Residuals under rudder fault 
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Figure 13 Residuals under elevator and aileron faults 
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Figure 14 Residuals under elevator and rudder faults 
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Figure 15 Residuals under aileron and rudder faults 
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Figure 17 I(k) under fault condition (elevator fault) 
Below is a table of the type of the fault present in the real system and its 
detection time: 
Table 4 Detection time of various faults 







F6  5.1 
F7 5.1 
 
From Table 4, we can see that the faults are detected within 0.2s after its 
onset. The detection speed using this method is also accurate. However, this test does 
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not distinguish the different types of faults present in the system. Upon detection of 
faults, fault diagnosis is done to isolate the faults in the system, which will be 





CHAPTER 4  FAULT DIAGNOSIS 
4.1 Methodology 
Fault diagnosis consists of two parts: fault isolation and fault identification. 
Fault isolation refers to finding the source or cause of the fault; fault identification 
refers to finding the magnitude of the fault. In this thesis, the focus is on fault 
isolation. 
When a fault is detected using chi-square testing, the output residuals are 
further analysed for fault identification. To differentiate the residuals from faulty 
systems with no-fault system, first we need to study the residual behaviours of no-
fault system.  
Y.M Chen and M.L Lee (2002) used neural networks to detect and diagnose 
system failure [22]. They used radial basis function (RBF) to detect stuck actuator 
failure of high performance aircraft. In the implementation, they came up with a 
residual index, which is the ratio between current residual and previous residual, and 
set a threshold, beyond which an error signal will be generated. Similarly, in this 
thesis, we study the residual behaviours of the system. However, instead of making 
use of an index to compare the residuals, we extract some useful information from the 
behaviour of residuals for study. We define a residual characteristic vector to quantify 
this information extracted from the residuals. 
Under ideal conditions, in the absence of noise, disturbance and fault, the 
residuals obtained from the residual generator model should be zero. However, in the 
presence of random white noise, the residuals are expected to deviate from zero. 
Threshold values are set to accommodate these deviations of residuals’ values. As 
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different output variables change differently with the addition of noise in the system, 
two separate different threshold values are set for each residual, ir , where i = 1, …, 6.  
In the thesis, the concept of residual characteristics of the systems is 
introduced. Residual characteristic is defined as the behaviour of the residual over the 
30-second simulation. Using the residuals of no-fault system, the residual 
characteristics are studied to set the threshold for fault diagnosis.  
The thresholds are set according to the residuals of no-fault system as shown 
on Figure 18. For each residual ir , we set two thresholds: the upper threshold level hτ  
to check the residual if it exceeds hτ  and the lower threshold level lτ  to check if the 
residual is lower than lτ during the simulation. With these two threshold levels, we 
defined two residual characteristics iHr  and iLr  for each residue ir . If the residual ir  
exceeds its upper threshold hτ , the residual characteristic iHr  is set to 1, otherwise iHr  
is set to zero. Similarly, if ir  is lower than its lower threshold lτ , the residual 
characteristic iLr  is set to 1. It is possible for ir  to exceed its upper threshold at a 
certain time, but falls below the lower threshold at a later time, or vice versa, during 
the simulation. In this case, both the residual characteristics iHr  and iLr  are set to 1. 
We gather the residual characteristics extracted from the residuals to form the residual 
characteristic vector: 
T
LLLLLLHHHHHHall rrrrrrrrrrrrR ],,,,,,,,,,,[ 654321654321=   (4.1) 
From allR , we reduce its size by further extracting useful residual 
characteristics, forming the vector R . The fault pattern injected into the system is a 
three-dimension vector F, whose components are denoted by f1, f2 and f3, such 
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that TfffF ],,[ 321= . Each component fi of the fault vector represents a physical 
actuator component, with f1 representing the elevator actuator, f2 representing the 
aileron actuator and f3 representing the rudder actuator. fi is assigned the value 1 if 
there is a fault in the particular actuator and zero if there is no fault. For example, we 
want to simulate faults in the elevator and rudder actuator, the fault vector will be 
represented by F = [1, 0, 1]T.  
For each fault pattern F injected into the system, we generate a set of 
residuals, of which we extract the residual characteristic vector R . From the residual 
characteristic vector R  extracted, we have the following relation: 
AFR =      (4.2) 
where R  is an n-dimension vector, mn xA ℜℜ∈  and F is a m-dimension vector. A is 
the transformation matrix which map the fault vector to the residual vector. In our 
simulation, seven sets of fault vector Fi, with i = 1, 2, .., 7, are injected and seven sets 
of residual characteristic vectors 
i
R , which corresponds to the seven sets of fault 
vectors, are extracted from the residuals generated. The seven sets of fault vector are 
defined according to the different possible actuator faults discussed in chapter 3.  
 From (4.2), we get: 

























where ],,,,,,[ 7654321 RRRRRRRR =  and ],,,,,,[ 7654321 FFFFFFFF = . 
Manipulating (4.3), we have the following: 
RAF ∆=      (4.4) 
    
∆
∆
= RFA      (4.5) 
where ∆A  and 
∆
R  are the pseudo-inverse of A and R  respectively. 
 In order to identify the fault presence in the system, we need to know ∆A , 
which can be calculated from (4.5). But to calculate ∆A , we need
∆
R , which is the 
pseudo-inverse of the matrix R  found in (4.3). As A and R  are not square matrices, 
their inverses cannot be found by the standard methods, like Gaussian elimination. 










RRRR     (4.6b) 
 The pseudo-inverse of the matrix does not exist if the matrix R  is not full row 
rank or full column rank. If R  is full row rank, the formula (4.6a) is used; otherwise 
if R  is full column rank, the formula (4.6b) is used.  
 After ∆A  is found, we can identify the fault vector using the residual 
characteristic vector from simulations by the expression: 
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   RAF ∆=      (4.7) 
4.2 Simulation Results 
 Using the simulation settings mentioned in section 3.2, we run the simulation 
under no-fault condition for 30 seconds and observe the six state variables. We set the 
smallest hτ  and the largest lτ  for each residual to keep it bounded. From Figure 18, 
we take the upper bounds hτ  and the lower bounds lτ  of the residuals. We can see 
that hτ  set for phi, theta, psi, roll rate, pitch rate and yaw rate are 2, 0.4, 1.7, 1.1, 0.4 





Figure 18 Setting of threshold levels for fault diagnosis 
 The simulation is further run under seven different fault conditions as shown 
on Table 3. As described in section 4.1, we observe the behaviours of the six residuals 
to extract the residual characteristics of the system. Different faults generate different 
residual characteristics. These residual characteristics will form the fault signature for 
each fault condition.  
 Using the residuals from the simulation of a system with aileron fault, we 
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show how residual characteristics can be extracted. From Figure 19 – 30, we can see 
the behaviour of the six residuals of the system with aileron actuator fault. In each 
figure, the upper dot-dashed line represents hτ  and the lower dotted line represents lτ . 
When a residual exceeds hτ  or goes below lτ , the respective residual characteristic 
variable will be assigned the value 1, otherwise the residual characteristic value will 
be zero. 
For example, from Figure 19 and 20, we can see that the residual of phi does 
not exceed hτ , so 01 =Hr , but the residual goes below lτ , so 11 =Lr . Similarly, from 
Figure 21 and 22, we get the value 02 =Hr  and 12 =Lr . We obtain the other residual 
characteristic values and form the residual characteristic vector allR  (4.1). The fault 
signature allR  is a vector of 12 elements, corresponding to the 12 residual 
characteristics that we are monitoring. We reduce the residual characteristics 
monitored to nine, as we only need to identify the seven fault conditions and one no-
fault condition. Thus, R  is a nine-dimension vector (n=9). 
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Figure 19 Residual of phi under aileron actuator fault 




















Figure 20 Residual of phi under aileron actuator fault (zoom-in) 
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Figure 21 Residual of theta under aileron actuator fault 



















Figure 22 Residual of theta under aileron actuator fault (zoom-in) 
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Figure 23 Residual of psi under aileron actuator fault 






































Figure 25 Residual of roll rate (P) under aileron actuator fault 


















Figure 26 Residual of roll rate (P) under aileron actuator fault (zoom-in) 
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Figure 27 Residual of pitch rate (Q) under aileron actuator fault 













































Figure 29 Residual of yaw rate (R) under aileron actuator fault 























 The fault coding for the seven fault conditions is shown in Table 3. The 
residual characteristic vectors corresponding to the different fault conditions are as 
follows: 
Table 5 Residual Characteristics 
Fault Residual characteristic vector 
F1
 
(1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)t 
F2 (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1)t 
F3 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)t 
F4 (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1)t 
F5 (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1)t 
F6 (0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1)t 
F7 (0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)t 
 
























































 With ∆A , we are able to isolate any LIP actuator faults in the system using the 
residual characteristic vector extracted from simulations with RAF ∆=  (4.7). 
 In this thesis, we have shown that how the residuals from the system can be 
studied to extract useful information to isolate faults in the system. We quantify the 
useful information extracted by defining a residual characteristic vector. When used 
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to detect more faults, other useful information can be used for fault isolation. For 
example, some residuals exhibit oscillatory behaviour. This property can be made 
used to form the residual characteristics used for fault detection. 
The method used is simpler and more direct in application as compared to the 
neural network approach proposed by Y.M Chen and M.L Lee (2002) [22]. However, 







PART II – STOCK MARKETS  
CHAPTER 5  CRASH FORECAST WITH LOG-PERIODIC 
FORMULA  
5.1 Methodology 
In the financial world, there are generally two approaches in analysing the 
financial markets: the technical approach and the fundamental approach. Technical 
analysis refers to the use of past market data, mainly price and volume, in analysing 
the market. Technical analysts believe that market prices incorporate all the market 
information. They believe in the existence of price patterns in the market and that 
these price patterns repeat themselves. By looking at charts, these analysts seek to 
find these price patterns and the market trends.  
Through chart study, many technical indicators have been developed to 
analyse the market. These indicators include charting overlays like support and 
resistance levels, price-based indicators like moving averages and relative strength 
index, and volume-based indicators like money flow. However, most of these 
indicators are only useful in studying market prices in normal market conditions. 
These indicators are ineffective in the study of abnormal market conditions like major 
market crashes. 
A. Johansen and D. Sornette (1998) have shown that large market crashes are 
outliers [39]. These outliers form a class of their own and need a different model to 
explain their behaviours. Common technical indicators used for detecting price 
patterns in the usual market conditions are not useful in studying these large market 
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crashes. New mathematical models and rules are required to study the behaviours of 
market crashes.  
The underlying cause of market crashes is the positive feedback of speculators 
in the market. This positive feedback gives raise to speculative bubbles. Speculative 
bubbles cause the market price to deviate from its fundamental, resulting in market 
instability.  
The mechanism behind this positive feedback is the imitative behaviour of the 
investors in the market, which leads to the herding effect. There are many 
explanations for the collective imitative behaviour of investors.  One of the reasons 
given is reputation herding of investors. These investors might have little information 
of the market and choose to follow the analysts’ recommendations. Thus, reputable 
analysts have an effect in influencing the market decisions of individual investors, 
which might result in collective buy/sell action in the market.  
Another reason given for collective behaviour is information cascades. 
Information cascades occur when the market is overwhelmed by aggregate 
information, overruling the private information that each individual might have. This 
results in euphoria in the market. All these mimic behaviours, resulting from these 
trend-followers, lead to positive feedback in the system, which create speculative 
bubbles. 
Trend-followers make up one group of investors in the market. The other 
group of investors are value-investors, who look at the fundamentals of companies 
when making investments. These value-investors restore the price in the market to its 
fundamental value. However, this restoring force often leads to overshoot in the target 
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price. With positive feedback from the trend-following speculators, the overshoot 
accelerates.  
The restoring force of the value-investors, together with the positive feedback 
from the speculators, results in accelerating oscillations in price. This explains the 
accelerating log-periodic behaviour of the price in the market, which we modelled 
using the log-periodic formula presented below: 
))log(cos()()()( φω +−−+−+= ttttCttBAtp czczc    (5.1) 
 where p(t) is the price index at time t, A, B and C are dummy variables, tc is the time 
of singularity or critical time when the probability of the crash is the highest, z is the 
rate of exponential increase due to the positive feedback, ω  is the angular frequency 
of the log-periodic oscillation and φ  the phase lag. 
  The method proposed for the study of stock market crashes makes use of the 
mathematical equation (5.1). As the equation is complicated with many variables, we 
break the equation into two parts for testing on real data. The first part of the equation 
is a power law formula (5.2) and the second part of the equation is the log-periodic 
oscillation (5.3): 
z
c ttBAtp )()(1 −+=       (5.2) 
))log(cos()()( ''2 φω +−−= ttttCtp cmc    (5.3) 
 The curve-fitting of the real stock index data to the log-periodic formula is an 
optimisation process. We make use of the least-square method in fitting the real data 
to the power law formula (5.2) and then in fitting the residue to the log-periodic 
oscillation (5.3). The algorithm used for the optimisation process is a large-scale 




 The power law formula (5.2) has an exponential term zc tt )( − . This term 
models the general upward trend of the stock price index. B represents the amplitude 
of the exponential increase; z represents the rate of the increase and tc the critical time 
when the probability of the crash is the highest. 
 The log-periodic oscillation formula (5.3) models the oscillatory movement of 
the stock index before a crush. It consists of an exponential term mc tt )( ' −  and an 
oscillatory term ))log(cos( ' φω +− ttc . In the oscillatory term, ω  represents the 
angular frequency of the stock index and φ  represents the phase difference between 
the stock index and the log-periodic parameterisation that we have done.  
As the log-periodic formula is complicated, we break the parameter 
identification process into three steps. First, we use the stock price data )(tp i  to find 
the regression equation on the power law formula (5.2) to identify the variables A, B, 
tc and z. In this regression equation, the dependable variable is price p1(t) and the 
independent variable is time t. After the power law formula has been parameterised, 
we calculate the residual by deducting the value obtained using parameterised power 
law from the stock price (5.4). 
  )()()( 1 tptptr −=       (5.4) 
The second step involves estimating the angular frequency ω . With the 
residual obtained, we find an angular frequency estimate 
∧
ω  by doing a fast Fourier 
transform on the residual )(tr and plot it in the frequency domain. We can then 




With this angular frequency estimate, we are able to set the initial value 0ω . 
Estimate for the critical time and the exponent term are taken from the values found 
earlier using the power law formula. These estimates are used to set as initial values 
for iteration when using the log-periodic formula to find the variable values. The 
initial values of dummy variable C and the phase lag φ  are generated randomly.  
The third step consists of finding the parameters in the log-periodic oscillatory 
formula (5.3). Due to the separation of log-periodic formula into two parts for the 
optimisation process, we have two different critical times, 'ct  in (5.3) and ct  in (5.2). 
The exponential power m in (5.3) is also different from the exponential z in (5.2). ct  
and z found earlier are set as initial values for iteration process to find '
ct  and m. The 
expression in (5.2) describes the upward trend of stock prices, while the expression in 
(5.3) describes the log-periodic oscillation, which causes the stock prices to collapse. 
Hence, we use 'ct  to predict the crash time, as depicted by a large decline in the stock 
index. 
 We apply this method on three stock indices. We apply it on the S&P 500 to 
predict the crash on Black Monday in 1987, STI to predict the stock market crash due 
to the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000 and DJIA to predict the crash during the 
credit crunch in 2008. The objective is to find a crash time using the above 
methodology, which is as close as the actual crash time in the stock market. 
5.2 Case Study 
5.5.1 Black Monday 
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Black Monday occurred on 19 October 1987. On this day, the S&P 500 
dropped 20.5% from 282.84 points to 224.84 points, the largest single-day drop in 
S&P 500 in history. Before the crash, it increased rapidly from 165.37 points in 2 Jan 
1985 to 336.77 points in 25 Aug 1987.  The figure below shows the performance of 
the S&P 500 before the crash: 

















Figure 31 Standard & Poor 500 
Using the data prior to the crash, we find the parameterised power law 
formula (5.2). Using the least-square method in fitting the real data to the power law 
formula, the parameters found are A = 317.8275, B = -78.9302, tc = 87.5703 and z = 
0.6764. The figure below shows the parameterised power law curve of S&P 500 
before the crash: 
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Figure 32 S&P 500 Power Law Parameter Fitting 
 
After finding the parameterised power law, we generate residuals by 
deducting the values calculated based on the power law from the S&P 500 data 
(Figure 33). With the residuals, we can find an estimate of the angular frequency by 
finding its spectrum by using Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT). The cyclic 
components of the log-periodic oscillation can be resolved by spectrum analysis using 
FFT. 
 From Figure 34, we can see that the amplitude of the spectrum peak at two 
extreme ends, the high frequency and the low frequency. The peak at high frequency 
is filtered off as it is most probably due to noises (eg. daily fluctuation of the stock 
index), thus is ignored. We zoom in the graph at the low frequency end to find a more 
precise value of the peak (Figure 35). The estimate of the angular frequency is 
∧





ω  = 12.246. 
 



















Figure 33 Residuals Obtained with Power Law Estimation 
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Figure 34 Residual Frequency Spectrum 
 


































Figure 36 S&P 500 Log-periodic Oscillation 
  The parameterised log-periodic oscillation (5.3) of the S&P 500 is then 
obtained and plotted (Figure 36). The parameters are C = -7.6722, m = 0.5000, 'ct = 
87.4443, ω = 13.0280 and φ = 3.3849. Putting together the parameterised power law 










The graph is plotted as follows: 
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Figure 37 S&P 500 Log-periodic Behaviour 
From Figure 37, we can see that the S&P 500 exhibited a log-periodic 
behaviour before the October 1987 crash. The estimated crash date of the S&P 500 is 
11 June 1987 (decimated date 'ct = 87.4443), which is about four months away from 
the actual crash. However, the parameterised log-periodic formula only predicted a 23 
points (6.8%) dip from the peak in August 1987. This shows that although the log-
periodic formula is able to give a good estimate of the date of the Black Monday 
crash in the S&P 500, it is unable to predict the magnitude of the crash.  
 
5.5.2 Dot-Com Bubble 
The dot-com bubble refers to the speculative bubble in many of the developed 
countries from 1995-2001. During this period, there was frenzy on internet-based 
companies. The market values of these companies increased rapidly as speculators 
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bided up the prices of the stocks. When the dot-com bubble burst, stock indices 
worldwide dropped significantly.  
In Singapore, the STI dropped 21.7% (560 points) in less than three months, 
from 2582 points on 3 January 2000 to 2022 points on 15 March 2000. Before the 
crash, the STI increased more than 220% (1777 points) in less than two years, from 
805 points on 4 September 1998 to 2582 points in 3 January 2000, as shown on 
Figure 38: 

















Figure 38 Straits Times Index 
Using data before the crash on 3 January 2000, we find the parameterised law 
periodic formula (5.2). The parameters found are: A = 3829.6, B = -1271.2, tc = 
2001.0874, z = 0.9. The figure below shows the parameterised power law curve of 
STI before the crash: 
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Figure 39 STI Power Law Parameter Fitting 
 
Residuals are generated using the parameterised power law and STI data 
(Figure 40). Using the generated residuals, its frequency spectrum is found using FFT 
(Figure 41). The angular frequency estimate is 
∧
f  = 2.9 Hz or 
∧




















Figure 40 Residuals Obtained with Power Law Estimation 

















Figure 41 Residual Frequency Spectrum 
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Figure 42 Residual Frequency Spectrum (zoom in) 
Using the angular frequency estimate and other parameters obtained earlier, 
the parameters for the log-periodic oscillation (5.3) are found using optimisation by 
iteration. The parameters are C = 145.8252, m = 0.1, 'ct = 2000.1357, ω = 7.7284 and 
φ = 1.2467. The log-periodic oscillation of the STI residual is plotted on Figure 43. 
Together with the log power law parameters found earlier, we have the following log-










 Using the formula above, two figures are plotted. Figure 44 shows the STI 
calculated from mid 1998 to early 2000 and its critical time singularity (tc) during the 
crash in the early 2000. tc determines the crash time of the stock index. Figure 45 








































Figure 44 STI Log-periodic Behaviour 
 

















Figure 45 STI Log-periodicity before Crash 
Using data before the crash to obtain the parameters for the log-periodic 
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formula, we are able predict the impeding crash in 2000 (Figure 44). Figure 45 further 
shows the evolution of the STI before the crash, which exhibits a log-periodic 
signature before the crash. The predicted crash time is 18 February 2000, which is 
less than 2 months from the actual crash. Hence, the log-periodic formula is fairly 
accurate in predicting the STI crash date due to the dot-com bubble.  
 
5.5.3 Global Financial Crisis 2008 
 The global financial crisis is an ongoing financial crisis that has affected the 
world stock markets. The crisis is caused by delinquency in subprime mortgages. The 
massive delinquency in subprime mortgages caused banks to run into liquidity 
problems and results in a credit crunch. The effect is widespread and has caused 
major stock indices around the world to crash.  
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Figure 46 Dow Jones Industrial Average 
The downtrend of the DJIA started from late 2007 (Figure 46). The index 
dropped 2142 points (15.2%), from 14093 points in 12 October 2007 to 11951 points 
in 14 March 2008. However, there are more prominent crashes from September 2008 
to December 2008. From 15 September to 1 December, the DJIA dropped a total of 
2768 points or 25.4%. The index dropped more than 7% in many days during this 
period. On 29 September, the index dropped 778 points (7.0%); on 9 October, it 
dropped 679 points (7.3%); on 15 October, it dropped 733 points (7.9%); and on 1 
December, it dropped 680 points (7.7%). Our objective is to determine a crash date 
from the log-periodic formula in (5.2) that is as close as the actual crash dates as 
possible.  
First, curve-fitting is done using data prior to the crash to find the parameters 
in the power law formula (5.2). Figure 47 shows the curve based on the power law, 
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with parameters A = 9583.1, B = 4827.7, tc = 8.6088, z = -1.3708. 


















Figure 47 DJIA Power Law Parameter Fitting 
Residuals are generated using the parameterised power law and DJIA data 
(Figure 48). Using the generated residuals, its frequency spectrum is found using FFT 
(Figure 49). The angular frequency estimate is 
∧
f  = 0.688 or 
∧




















Figure 48 Residuals Obtained with Power Law Estimation 















Figure 49 Residual Frequency Spectrum 
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Figure 50 Residual Frequency Spectrum (zoom-in view) 
After finding the estimate of the angular frequency, and using the parameters 
found earlier to set the initial values for iteration to parameterise the law periodic 
oscillation formula (5.3).  Figure 51 shows the parameterised log-periodic oscillation, 
with C = 144.5417, m = -0.1327, 'ct = 8.1492, ω =10.2878 and φ =-0.623. Putting the 































Figure 51 DJIA Log-periodic Oscillation 



















From Figure 52, we can see the critical time singularity due to log-periodic 
oscillation. The crash time obtained using (5.3) is 'ct = 8.4192 (25 February 2008), 
which is earlier than the major crashes in September 2008. However, the crash time 
determined is within the period of major declines in DJIA from October 2007 to late 
2008 (Figure 46).  
In this chapter, using a technical analysis approach, the log-periodic formula 
has been proposed to predict market crashes. Three crashes, the Black Monday, the 
dotcom bubble and the global financial crisis in 2008, have been studied. These case 
studies have shown favourable result in the prediction of the crash dates. However, 





CHAPTER 6  CRASH FORECAST WITH INDICATORS 
6.1 Methodology 
Fundamental analysis refers to the use of fundamental economic indicators, 
for example GDP and interest rate, to analyse the market. Economic indicators reflect 
the economic health of a country. In “leading indicators of currency crisis”, 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart have found that several economic indicators exhibit 
unusual behaviour before the currency crisis using empirical evidence from the past 
[30] and develop an early warning system (EWS) model to predict currency crisis.  
This EWS model makes use of several economic indicators to analyse 
currency crisis. By setting a threshold for each of these indicators, an indicator is said 
to have issued a signal if its value exceeds or falls below the threshold value. The 
principle of the model is to select the indicators whose contributions to the crisis 
prediction are the greatest. In the paper by Zhuang and Dowling (2002), they found 
out that weightings can be assigned according to the relative importance of the 
economic indicators to improve the accuracy of the currency crisis prediction.  
The health of the economic environment can have an effect on the stock 
market. Bordo and Wheelock (2006) found that the 20th century stock market booms 
were closely linked to domestic and international macroeconomic policies [40]. They 
create monthly real stock index for ten countries and found that booms occurred 
during periods of above moderate economic growth and below average inflation rate.  
An earlier study done by Heatcotte and Apilado (1974) made used of leading 
economic indicators to devise trading rules [41]. The trading rules constructing an 
index using economic indicators and filter the period to buy and sell a particular stock 
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or a basket of stocks. However, their simulation result was not outstanding. 
There are many other studies done by academic on the influence of a 
particular macroeconomic indicator on the stock market. Using empirical evidence 
from Singapore and the US, Wong, Khan and Du (2005) has found that stock prices 
are in long-run equilibrium with interest rate, though the relationship is less evident in 
the US [42].  
Abdalla and Murinde (1997) have found the causal linkages between leading 
prices in foreign exchange markets and the stock markets in emerging countries [42].  
Wu (2001) has found that a negative correlation between stock prices in Singapore 
and Singapore dollar exchange rate with respect to developed countries’ currencies 
before and during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis [43].  
Doing a case study on Cyprus, Tsoukalas (2003) used a Vector Autoregressive 
(VAR) model to study the relationship between macroeconomic factors and stock 
prices [35]. In the case study, the Granger causality test was implemented by using 
the VAR equation of the form : tit
k
i




, where RSt refers to the stock 
return at time t and Xt-1 refers to the macroeconomic factor, for example CPI or 
exchange rate, at time t-1. From the test, Tsoukalas has found that macroeconomic 
indicators and stock prices in Cyprus are strongly related. 
Estrella and Mishkin (1996) have further shown the interest rate yield curve is 
useful in predicting recessions in the United States (US) [29]. Interest rate yield curve 
spread is calculated by taking the difference between the interest rate on ten-year 
Treasury note and the three-month Treasury bill. It was found that the recession 
probability increases when the value of the spread becomes more negative. For 
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example, the probability of a recession four quarters ahead is 50% when the spread is 
-0.82. 
 In this thesis, we set up an early warning system and test its accuracy in 
detecting stock market crashes. Although there are research works being done on 
EWS, most of these works have been applied to currency crisis and none has been 
used for stock market crashes. Moreover, in most literatures, the time horizon for a 
crisis to happen is within 24 months upon the signal indication. In our research, we 
tested our EWS for stock market crashes within 12 months of signal indication.  
A stock market crash refers to a sharp decline in the stock index. In this thesis, 
we identify monthly drops of more than 5% in the stock index as crashes in the 
market. To set up an early warning system model for stock crashes, we monitor a set 
of indicators that reflect the general health of the economy.  These indicators include 
GDP and CPI which reflect performance in the real sector of the economy; bank loan 
rate and yield curve which reflect the financial sector; exchange rate, current account, 
capital account and the national reserve (excluding gold) which reflect the external 
sector and the price of gold as market sentiment on the commodity market. Monthly 
data of these indicators are collected. These indicators are monitored for any 
divergence from their “normal” levels.  
The behaviour of each monitored indicator differs before a market crash. 
While analysing the behaviour of each indicator, we set a different threshold for each 
indicator. The threshold level is set to define the boundary of the “normal” level of 
the indicator. When the indicator exceeds its threshold value, it is taken as a warning 
signal that the stock market might crash in the next 12 months. This threshold value is 
  
 87 
chosen to strike a balance between false signals and missed signals. When the 
threshold value is set too high, the false signals will be low but there will be many 
missed signals. Similarly, if the threshold value is set too low, there will be many 
false signals though the number of missed signals is low. The table below shows the 
grid of four possible scenarios in signal generated for crash prediction: 
Table 6 Grid of Signal and Crash 
 Crash 
(within 12 months) 
No Crash 
(within 12 months) 
Signal A B 
No Signal C D 
 
In this grid, A is the total number of months the indicator generate a signal 
which has predicted correctly a crash within 12 months. B is the total number of 
months the indicator generate a false signal when no crash is observed within the next 
12 months. C is the total number of months of missed signal of a crash and D is the 
total number of months when the indicator does not generate signal when there is no 
crash within the next 12 months. An ideal indicator is one that generates signals for 
crash (A) and does not generate signal when there is no crash (D), such that B and C 
are zeros.  
Table 7 Performance of Indicators 
Total 
no. of 












For each stock market studied, a table is tabulated according to Table 7 to 
show the performance of various indicators. The first column indicates the total 
number of crashes over the period when data for a particular indicator is available.  
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The second column of the table indicates the number of crashes the indicator 
issued at least one signal in the previous 12 months. This statistic is different from the 
statistic A from Table 6, which is the total number of months which a signal issued, is 
followed by a crash within 12 months.  
Using the statistics from Table 6, we calculate the ratio A/(A+C) which is the 
ratio of the number of good signals to the possible number of good signals could have 
been issued. This ratio should be as big as possible. Ratio of one would mean that the 
indicator issues a signal every month during the 12 months before a crash. This 
statistic will be tabulated on the third column of Table 7.  
The ratio B/(B+D), which is the ratio of the number of bad signal to the 
possible number of bad signal could have been issued, is also calculated. This ratio 
should be as low as possible. This statistic is shown on the fourth column of Table 7.  
Fifth column of Table 7 shows the noise-to-signal ratio of the various 
indicators studied. The noise-to-signal ratio is calculated by taking the ratio of the two 
results found earlier, [B/(B+D)]/[A/(A+C)]. This statistic shows the ratio of false 
signal to good signal. It reflects the ability of the indicator to issue good signal and 
avoid false signal. Ratio of more than one would mean that the indicator issued more 
false signals than good signals, which makes the indicator unsuitable for predicting a 
crash. 
Another way of comparing the “noisiness” of the indicators is by looking at 
the ratio A/(A+B), which indicates the proportion of signal issued by indicator 
followed by a crash within the next 12 months. This ratio should be as high as 
possible. Ratio of one would mean that every signal issued is followed by a crash in 
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the next 12 months.  
After comparing the performance of the various indicators, we select the 
indicators with noise-to-signal ratio of less than one to form the components of an 
early warning system (EWS). Each of these components is denoted by ci and will also 
be assigned a weighting wi, which reflects its relative importance in the EWS model. 
The EWS indicator value is calculated by the formula below: 
∑=
i
ii wcI       (6.1) 
When the value I calculated in (6.1) exceeds a certain threshold, a “crash” 
signal is issued. A table is tabulated to show the total number of crashes during the 
period of study, the number of crashes detected, the number of good signals issued 
and the total number of false signal issued. 
6.2 Case Study 
6.2.1 Standard and Poor 500 (S&P 500) 
 Using monthly S&P 500 index data from January 1981 to December 2005, we 
have identified 15 instances with a monthly drop of more than 5%. We have selected 
ten indicators for signal generation to detect these crashes. These indicators are US 
GDP quarter-on-quarter (q-o-q) growth rate, bank loan rate, CPI year-on-year (y-o-y) 
change, exchange rate month-on-month (m-o-m) fluctuation, current account, capital 
account, national reserve (exclude gold), yield curve, gold price and the volatility 
index (VIX) obtained from the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE). 
 Different threshold values are set for different indicators. The threshold values 
are determined from past values of the indicators, chosen to strike a balance between 
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false signal and missed signal of a crash. For GDP q-o-q growth rate, the lower 
threshold is set to be 0.2%, below which a signal is being generated (Figure 53). For 
the bank lending rate, an upper threshold is set at 9.4%, above which a signal is 
generated (Figure 54) and for CPI y-o-y change, a lower threshold is set at 0% 
(Figure 55).  
The statistic for the US exchange rate used in the thesis is obtained from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) tabulated by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).  This statistic is calculated by weighting the US Dollar against a basket of 
currencies. Using the exchange rate statistic, we calculated its m-o-m fluctuation. 
Two threshold values are then set. The upper threshold is 4% and the lower threshold 
is -4% (Figure 56). 
Three statistics (current account, capital account, month-on-month change in 
national reserve) which reflect the external sector of the economy are grouped 
together to form a single indicator for analysis. When at least two out of the three 
statistics monitored exceed their respective threshold levels for a particular month, a 
signal is generated; otherwise, no signal is generated. The lower threshold set for the 
current account is -US$30 billion (Figure 57), the lower threshold set for the capital 
account is -US$3 billion (Figure 58) and the lower threshold set for the month-on-
month change in national reserve is -4% (Figure 59). 
For the yield curve, the lower threshold set is 0.5% (Figure 60). Two threshold 
values are set for the price of gold per troy ounce. The upper threshold is set at 
US$450 and the lower threshold is set at US$300 (Figure 61). For VIX, an upper 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 58 US Capital Account 
 



























































































Figure 60 Yield Curve 
 
































































































Figure 62 CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) 
With the available data for the various signal-generating indicators, the values 
of A, B, C and D, presented in Table 6, are calculated. These values are tabulated in 
Table 8. In table 9, we can further see the performance of the indicators in S&P 500 
crash prediction.  
In term of the number of detected crashes, gold price is the best indicator. The 
indicator is able to issue a signal within 12 months before a crash for 12 out of the 15 
crashes observed. The exchange rate indicator is the worst indicator, issuing a signal 
for only three out of the 11 crashes observed. 
For the ratio of good signal to the number of months a good signal could have 
been issued, the bank lending rate is the best indicator, which issued 44.5% of 
possible good signals. The external sector indicator, which consists of the current 
account, capital account and national reserve components, is the worst indicator, 
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issuing only 4% of possible good signals.  
For the ratio of bad signal to the number of months a bad signal could have 
been issued, the VIX is the best indicator, with a ratio of zero. The worst indicator, 
the bank lending rate, has a ratio of only 28.4%. This shows that the incidence of bad 
signals issued by the indicators studied is low. 
The fifth column of Table 9 indicates the noise to signal ratio. From the table, 
the ratios for all the indicators are less than one. The VIX is the best indicator, with a 
ratio of zero.  
The VIX is also the best indicator in term of proportion of signal issued 
followed by crash within the next 12 months. A ratio of one indicates that every 
signal issued by the VIX indicator is followed by a crash within the next 12 months.  
 
Table 8 Components of Grid for S&P 500 Crash Prediction 
 A B C D 
GDP  13 5 90 169 
Bank Lending 
Rate 
49 50 61 126 
CPI  29 27 63 144 
Exchange Rate  3 6 76 154 
External 
Sector 
4 5 95 170 
Yield Curve 35 14 76 162 
Gold Price 48 21 61 158 
VIX 10 0 45 113 
 
Table 9 Performance of Indicators for S&P 500 Crash Prediction 
 Total 
no. of 











GDP  15 7 0.126 0.028 0.227 0.722 
Bank 
Lending Rate 
15 8 0.445 0.284 0.637 0.494 
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CPI  12 7 0.315 0.157 0.500 0.517 
Exchange 
Rate  
11 3 0.037 0.037 0.987 0.333 
External 
Sector 
13 5 0.040 0.028 0.707 0.444 
Yield Curve 15 9 0.315 0.079 0.252 0.714 
Gold Price 15 12 0.440 0.117 0.266 0.695 
VIX 8 6 0.181 0 0 1 
 
 As the noise-to-signal ratios of all the indicators are less than one, all the 
indicators studied are selected as components of the EWS. The number of 
components is eight. The notation for the various components in the EWS is assigned 
successively according to Table 9, with GDP denoted by c1, the bank lending rate 
denoted by c2¸ and so on. Weightings are assigned to each indicator based on the 
proportion of crashes detected over period whereby data are available. For the period 
when all data is available, the weightings are w1 = 0.106, w2 = 0.121, w3 = 0.133, w4 
= 0.062, w5 = 0.088, w6 = 0.137, w7 = 0.182 and w8 = 0.171.   
A single EWS indicator is formed. The indicator value is calculated by (6.1) 
and compared to the threshold value of 0.3. When the EWS indicator value is more 
than 0.3 in a particular month, a warning signal is generated. The result is 
summarised in the table below: 
Table 10 Crash Detection with EWS 
Total Crashes Crashes Detected Right Signal False Signal 
15 12 44 8 
 
From the table, we can see that the proportion of crashes detected is high 
(80%). Out of 52 signals issued, 44 or 84.6% are right signals. This means that 86.4% 
of the signals issued are followed by a crash within 12 months.   
In summary, the eight indicators studied are useful for S&P 500 crash 
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prediction. The performance of the indicators varies when different statistics are used 
to analysis them. Overall, yield curve and gold price give a good prediction with a 
high percentage of crashes detected, a high proportion of good signal, low proportion 
of false signal and a low noise to signal ratio. The EWS, formed by the various 
economic and market indicators studied, is able to predict 80% of the crashes in S&P 
500. The proportion of right signal issued is also high. 
 
6.2.2 Straits Times Index (STI) 
 Using monthly STI data from January 1995 to December 2004, we have 
identified 17 instances with a monthly drop of more than 5%.  We have selected nine 
indicators for study. These nine indicators  are Singapore GDP q-o-q growth rate, 
bank loan rate, CPI y-o-y change, exchange rate m-o-m fluctuation, current account, 
capital account, national reserve (exclude gold), gold price and VIX. 
 Different thresholds are set for different indicators. For Singapore GDP q-o-q 
growth, the lower threshold is set to be 0.1%, below which a warning signal is 
generated (Figure 63). For Singapore bank lending rate, an upper threshold of 7% is 
set, beyond which a signal is issued (Figure 64). For CPI y-o-y change, the lower 
threshold is 0.1% (Figure 65). 
 The source for the exchange rate data is the IFS tabulated by the IMF. The 
statistic is calculated by weighting the Singapore dollar against a basket of currencies. 
Using this statistic, we calculate its monthly fluctuation.  Two thresholds are being 
set. The upper threshold is 1% and the lower threshold is -1% (Figure 66). 
 Similar to S&P 500 crash analysis, we group the three statistics (current 
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account, capital account, national reserve) together for analysis. When at least two 
statistics exceed the thresholds for a particular month, a warning signal is issued. The 
lower threshold for the current account is S$ 1200 million (Figure 67); the lower 
threshold for capital account is –S$15 million (Figure 68); the lower threshold for m-
o-m change in national reserve (excluding gold) is -0.1% (Figure 69).  
 Two thresholds are set for gold prices (Figure 70). The upper threshold is set 
to be US$395 per troy ounce and lower threshold is set to be US$290 per troy ounce. 
As volatility index is not available for the STI, we make use of VIX tabulated by 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 66 SGD Exchange Rate Month-on-Month Change 
 


















































































































































Figure 68 Singapore Capital Account 
 




































































































































































































































































































Table 11 shows the statistics for the various indicators for STI crash 
prediction. Table 12 further shows the performance of the various indicators. 
 In term of crashes detected, both the GDP indicator and the external sector are 
perfect indicators, with at least a signal issued for all crashes detected. The bank 
lending rate is the worst indicator, issuing correct signal for only five out of the 17 
crashes.  
 The external sector indicator also has the highest ratio of good signal to the 
number of months a good signal could have been issued. It also has the lowest noise 
to signal ratio of 0.249 and the highest proportion of signal issued (93.4%) followed 
by crash within the next 12 months. 
 Four out of the seven indicators have a noise to signal ratio of more than one. 
This means that these indicators issued more false signals than good signals. These 
indicators are unsuitable for crash detection, despite the high detection rate of some 
indicators.  
Table 11 Summary of Result for STI Crash Prediction 
 A B C D 
GDP 28 12 47 9 
Bank Lending 
Rate 
8 2 68 19 




13 5 53 14 
External 
Sector 
43 3 32 18 
Gold Price 37 5 42 13 




Table 12 Performance of Indicators for STI Crash Prediction 
 Total 
no. of 











GDP  17 17 0.373 0.571 1.530 0.7 
Bank 
Lending Rate 
17 5 0.105 0.095 0.904 0.8 
CPI  16 6 0.265 0.333 1.254 0.708 
Exchange 
Rate  
17 13 0.196 0.263 1.336 0.722 
External 
Sector 
17 17 0.573 0.142 0.249 0.934 
Gold Price 17 14 0.468 0.277 0.593 0.880 
VIX 17 15 0.381 0.523 1.372 0.725 
 
 The selected indicators to form the components of the EWS are bank lending 
rate indicator, denoted by c1, external sector indicator, denoted by c2, and the gold 
price indicator, denoted by c3. The weightings are w1 = 0.139, w2 = 0.472 and w3 = 
0.389. The EWS indicator value is calculated using (6.1). It is compared to a 
threshold of 0.3, beyond which the EWS issue a warning signal. The table below 
shows the result: 
Table 13 Crash Detection with EWS 
Total Crashes Crashes Detected Right Signal Wrong Signal 
17 17 53 6 
 
 The EWS is able to detect all the 17 crashes in the STI during the period 
January 1995 to December 2004. Out of 59 signals issued during that period, only six 
are wrong signals. This means that only 10% of the signals issued by the EWS 
indicator are wrong.  
In summary, most of the indicators are shown to be unsuitable for use in crash 
detection for the STI index. However, three indicators (bank lending rate, external 
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sector and the gold price) proved to be useful as components in the the early detection 
system in crash detection. This EWS formed for STI also has a low rate of wrong 
signal issued. 
In this chapter, fundamental analysis is done on economic indicators and an 
EWS is set up to predict market crashes. Case studies are done on the S&P 500 and 
the STI and the results have shown that the EWS set up using this methodology give 
remarkable results for predicting market crashes in the S&P. However, the results for 
predicting crashes in the STI are not outstanding. 
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CHAPTER 7  CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, we have studied fault detection and prediction in the field of 
engineering and financial world. For engineering application, we make use of the chi-
square test method for fault detection in an F-16 aircraft and devise a new method of 
fault diagnosis using the characteristics of residuals in the system.  
The main contribution of this thesis is the fast detection of actuator faults 
using chi-square testing, the extraction of residual characteristics from the residual 
behaviour and the use of simple mapping method to identify the type of actuator fault 
from its fault signature.  
We have shown that using chi-square testing method, actuator faults can be 
detected within 0.2 second accurately. To isolate the fault, we observe the residual 
behaviour and extract useful residual characteristics. The mapping method used for 
identifying the system fault with the residual characteristic vector is simple and thus 
need low computation power.   
The current work is investigative in nature. Further works can be done to 
include other types of faults, such as the sensor faults. More residual characteristics 
can be studied when other faults are considered.  
In the field of finance, we have studied market crashes using two approaches, 
using technical analysis for stock market crashes and using indicators to set up an 
early warning system for crashes. In technical analysis, we have studied the STI for 
the dot-com crash in 2000 and the DJIA for the recent 2007-2008 stock market crash 
rooted from the subprime crisis.  Our method has shown result in predicting the STI 
crash in 2000. The STI exhibited log periodic behaviour and singularity before the 
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crash. Using the log-periodic formula, we can also estimate the crash dates of the 
indices to an accuracy of within 6 months from the actual crashes. Our work on recent 
DJIA crash has also shown promising result, with a predicted crash date in the period 
of large market crashes between 2007 and 2008. 
In the indicator approach, we have extended the research on EWS from 
currency crisis predictions to stock market crash predictions. We have shown that 
some economic indicators are useful in the prediction of market crashes. These 
indicators can be extended to statistics that reflect the real economy, the commodity 
market such as gold and market indicator such as the volatility index. Further work 
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